= Cryptography = == Linear feedback shift registers (LFSRs) == A special type of stream cipher is implemented in Sage, namely, a LFSR sequence defined over a finite field. Stream ciphers have been used for a long time as a source of pseudo-random number generators. S. Golomb ("Shift register sequences", Aegean Park Press, Laguna Hills, Ca, 1967) gives a list of three statistical properties a sequence of numbers $\mathbf{a}=\{ a_n \}_{n=1}^\infty$, $a_n\in \{0,1\},$ should display to be considered "random". Define the autocorrelation of $ {\bf a}$ to be $$ C(k)=C(k,{\bf a})=\lim_{N\rightarrow \infty} {1\over N}\sum_{n=1}^N (-1)^{a_n+a_{n+k}}. $$ In the case where $ {\bf a}$ is periodic with period $ P$ then this reduces to $$ C(k)={1\over P}\sum_{n=1}^P (-1)^{a_n+a_{n+k}}. $$ Assume $ {\bf a}$ is periodic with period $ P$ . * ''balance'': $ \vert\sum_{n=1}^P(-1)^{a_n}\vert\leq 1$ . * ''low autocorrelation'': $$ C(k)= \left\{ \begin{array}{cc} 1,& k=0,\\ \epsilon, & k\not= 0. \end{array}\right. $$ (For sequences satisfying these first two properties, it is known that $ \epsilon=-1/P$ must hold.) * ''proportional runs property'': In each period, half the runs have length $ 1$ , one-fourth have length $ 2$ , etc. Moreover, there are as many runs of $ 1$ 's as there are of 0 's. A sequence satisfying these properties will be called '''pseudo-random'''. A general feedback shift register is a map $ f:{\bf F}_q^d\rightarrow {\bf F}_q^d$ of the form $$ \begin{array}{c} f(x_0,...,x_{n-1})=(x_1,x_2,...,x_n),\\ x_n=C(x_0,...,x_{n-1}), \end{array}$$ where $ C:{\bf F}_q^d\rightarrow {\bf F}_q$ is a given function. When $ C$ is of the form $\displaystyle C(x_0,...,x_{n-1})=c_0x_0+...+c_{n-1}x_{n-1}, $ for some given constants $ c_i\in {\bf F}_q$ , the map is called a linear feedback shift register (LFSR). The sequence of coefficients $ c_i$ is called the '''key''' and the polynomial $\displaystyle C(x) = 1+ c_0x +...+c_{n-1}x^n $ is sometimes called the '''connection polynomial'''. '''Example''': Over $ GF(2)$ , if $ [c_0,c_1,c_2,c_3]=[1,0,0,1]$ then $ C(x) = 1 + x + x^4$ , $\displaystyle x_n = x_{n-4} + x_{n-1}, n\geq 4. $ The LFSR sequence is then $$ \begin{array}{c} 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1... ..., 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1,, ... . \end{array}$$ The sequence of $ 0,1$ 's is periodic with period $ P=2^4-1=15$ and satisfies Golomb's three randomness conditions. However, this sequence of period 15 can be "cracked" (i.e., a procedure to reproduce $ g(x)$ ) by knowing only 8 terms! This is the function of the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm (James L. Massey, Shift-Register Synthesis and BCH Decoding, IEEE Trans. on Information Theory, vol. 15(1), pp. 122-127, Jan 1969.), implemented as `lfsr_connection_polynomial` (which produces the reverse of `berlekamp_massey`). {{{ sage: F = GF(2) sage: o = F(0) sage: l = F(1) sage: key = [l,o,o,l]; fill = [l,l,o,l]; n = 20 sage: s = lfsr_sequence(key,fill,n); s [1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0] sage: lfsr_autocorrelation(s,15,7) 4/15 sage: lfsr_autocorrelation(s,15,0) 8/15 sage: lfsr_connection_polynomial(s) x^4 + x + 1 sage: berlekamp_massey(s) x^4 + x^3 + 1 }}} == Classical crytosystems == Sage has a type for cryptosystems (created by David Kohel, who also wrote the examples below), implementing classical cryptosystems. The general interface is as follows: {{{ sage: S = AlphabeticStrings() sage: S Free alphabetic string monoid on A-Z sage: E = SubstitutionCryptosystem(S) sage: E Substitution cryptosystem on Free alphabetic string monoid on A-Z sage: K = S([ 25-i for i in range(26) ]) sage: e = E(K) sage: m = S("THECATINTHEHAT") sage: e(m) GSVXZGRMGSVSZG }}} Here's another example: {{{ sage: S = AlphabeticStrings() sage: E = TranspositionCryptosystem(S,15); sage: m = S("THECATANDTHEHAT") sage: G = E.key_space() sage: G Symmetric group of order 15! as a permutation group sage: g = G([ 3, 2, 1, 6, 5, 4, 9, 8, 7, 12, 11, 10, 15, 14, 13 ]) sage: e = E(g) sage: e(m) EHTTACDNAEHTTAH }}} The idea is that a ``cryptosystem`` is a map $E: KS \rightarrow Hom_{Set}(MS,CS)$ where KS, MS, and CS are the key space, plaintext (or message) space, and ciphertext space, respectively. E is presumed to be injective, so `e.key()` returns the pre-image key.